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productivity across firms. Since reforms began, resource flows have increased in both
countries, and their contributions to aggregate productivity growth have become substantial
both through increased flows from less productive to more productive continuing firms and
through higher exits of less productive entities – i.e., through creative destruction. Among
the policy-relevant factors that may explain firm-level variation, privatization is estimated to
have positive effects on productivity-enhancing reallocation, but there is less evidence of
such effects from domestic product market competition, labor market competition, or import
penetration.
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1. Introduction
Well-functioning market economies appear to exhibit rapid rates of resource
reallocation across production units, a process with the potential to contribute significantly to
economic growth.

The empirical regularities of these processes have been extensively

documented in studies of job reallocation, such as those by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson
(1989a, 1989b) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1999). The relationship between
reallocation and productivity has been analyzed by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992),
Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998), and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), among others.1
Whether the potential for productivity-enhancing reallocation is realized is likely to
be a function of a number of factors. Existing theoretical models tend to emphasize frictions
in product and factor markets (Caballero and Hammour, 1996, 2000), externalities associated
with innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992), or the impact of international trade (Bernard et
al., 2003; Melitz, 2003). An additional factor could be corporate governance that affects the
responsiveness of a firm’s reallocation decisions to its relative productivity. Addressing
these issues empirically, however, has been impeded by difficulties in measuring such factors
and by their limited variation in most data. Few studies have examined abrupt policy changes
whose effects can be analyzed with pre- and post-policy data on the same set of business
units.2 Few studies have been able to measure the variation in policy-relevant variables at the
firm level and to estimate their effects by relating the firm-level variation to aggregate
growth.
This paper contributes to understanding the determinants of productivity-enhancing
resource reallocation by analyzing microeconomic data from a remarkable quasi-experiment:
the transition in the former Soviet Union.

We study changes in the contributions of

reallocation to productivity growth in Russia and Ukraine using consistent panel data from
1985 to 2001 that cover nearly the universe of industrial enterprises operating under Soviet
socialism and their successor firms in the post-Soviet period. Although some of these
enterprises have split up, spun off assets, exited, or merged with others, we are able to follow

1

Outside the U.S., job flow studies include Albaek and Sorensen (1998) on Denmark; Baldwin, Dunne, and
Haltiwanger (1998) on Canada (in comparison with the U.S.); Levinsohn (1999) on Chile; and Roberts (1996)
on Chile, Columbia, and Morocco. The effects of reallocation on productivity growth in countries other than the
U.S. have been analyzed by Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) for Taiwan, Griliches and Regev (1995) for Israel,
and Liu and Tybout (1996) for Chile and Columbia. Studies of transition economies are discussed below.
2
The only exceptions appear to be Olley and Pakes (1996) on deregulation and productivity in the U.S.
telecommunications equipment sector, and Tybout and Westbrook (1995) and Pavcnik (2002) on the effects of
import liberalization on productivity growth in Mexico and Chile, respectively. The methods and results of
these studies, which tend to find that liberalization raises productive reallocation, are discussed further below.
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a set of producers that is quite consistent in composition and variable definitions across time
and countries.
Our analysis exploits several sources of substantial variation in these data. First, the
Soviet transition involved one of the most drastic shifts in economic policy during recorded
history, as central planning and state control gave way to liberalized markets and private
ownership within just a few years during the mid-1990s. Our 17 years of data permit us to
compare behavior before and after these radical policy changes. How high were reallocation
rates and how much did they contribute to productivity growth during the Soviet period?
More recently, have the pace and productivity effects of reallocation become similar to those
documented for mature market economies?
Secondly, the policy shifts took place at rather different rates in Russia and Ukraine,
the two largest successor states of the Soviet Union. While sharing a common starting point
in the Soviet period, Ukraine has by all accounts followed a more “gradualist” path of slower
liberalization, privatization, and stabilization than its larger neighbor for most of the period
since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union split up. More recently, in the late 1990s,
policy reforms in Ukraine appear to have been catching up, according to the aggregate
statistics and the evaluations of international organizations. At the same time, the reform
process in both countries has been heavily criticized. Do the different reform strategies result
in differences in the pace of productivity-enhancing reallocation?
Thirdly, we analyze firm-level variation, within and across countries, in several
policy-relevant variables:

private ownership and competitive pressures from domestic

product markets, labor markets, and imports from OECD, less developed, and CIS countries.
Our motivation for examining privatization is the possibility of improved corporate
governance leading to increased responsiveness of firms to their relative productivity levels,
while increased competition in product and labor markets may either serve to discipline nonprofit-maximizing managers or to induce reallocation among profit-maximizing firms
operating in non-competitive markets (as in Bernard et al., 2003; or Melitz, 2003).
Exploiting the considerable variation in the extent and timing of privatization and in the
degree of import penetration and product and labor market concentration in our data, we
develop procedures to relate the extent of productivity-enhancing reallocation to these firmand industry-level variables, permitting an assessment of the interfirm reallocation patterns
through which the policies of privatization and liberalization may affect aggregate
productivity growth. Our analysis of privatization benefits from the fact that we observe
firms for several years both before and after privatization took place, while our approach to
2

the effects of liberalization involves an analysis of changes in the relationship between
productivity-enhancing reallocation and the structure of product and labor markets. Have
these economic reforms stimulated firms to engage in greater amounts of productive
reallocation?
Finally, we consider all of these sources of variation simultaneously. The Soviet
period provides a convenient baseline for considering the variation in microeconomic
behavior, as we can assess any pre-privatization differences between firms that were later
privatized and those that were to remain state-owned, and we can assess the extent to which
product and labor market structure might have already been associated with productive
reallocation under central planning. Considering the subsequent developments in Russia and
Ukraine relative to this baseline, have privatization and liberalization had a bigger impact on
the extent to which productivity growth is associated with resource reallocation in a country
following a more rapid reform program? Or perhaps is it rather the gradualist strategy that
makes private ownership and competitive markets function more effectively? These are the
main questions considered in our analysis.
Our database is quite appropriate for addressing these questions. At the beginning of
transition, in 1992, the data account for 90.5 percent of officially reported industrial
employment in Russia and 94.1 percent in Ukraine. We have annual observations from 1985
to 2001 for the Russian firms and from 1992 to 2000 for those in Ukraine, permitting us to
analyze the effects of reforms on a set of firms that we observe both before and after the
policy changes. With respect to these firms, the data provide a nearly ideal setting for
examining the effects of changes in economic institutions and policies on reallocation and
productivity growth.3

Not only are the data comparable across time, but also across

countries. Both the scope and the variable definitions are essentially identical, as we have
constructed the database from original data provided by the Russian and Ukrainian State
Statistical Committees, which were branches of the same organization during the Soviet
period and which still employ the same reporting methods as they did formerly. The data
contain identical measurement concepts for employment, output, and industrial classification
across the two countries, and they permit us to construct comparable measures of private
ownership and product market and local labor market structure.4 The earlier Russian data

3

The data are relatively weak in their ability to track small firms and exit and entry patterns. Comparing the
pre- and post-transition periods also involves some measurement difficulties. Section 3 discusses these issues
further and how we address them, together with a detailed description of the data sources and construction.
4
Cross-country studies of job reallocation, for instance, are typically fraught with inconsistent definitions and
measurement methods; see, e.g., the discussion of typical comparability problems and of the harmonization of
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permit us to trace out longer-term changes from the pre-perestroika Soviet period into the
transition; given that Ukraine was governed by the same economic and political regime as
Russia, the 1985-92 behavior for Ukraine is unlikely to differ substantially from Russia’s,
although the earlier Ukrainian data are unavailable for study.
Our research builds on previous work for the U.S. and other developed and less
developed market economies, particularly decomposition methods recently proposed by
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001).5 Our data, however, pertain to a situation displaying
much more variation in the policy regime – both over time and across countries – than those
in previous research, and we are able to characterize the impact of firm-level variables
representing the effects of policy changes (privatization and liberalization) on the strength of
the reallocation-productivity relationship. The paper is also relevant to the growing literature
on the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Studies of
microeconomic productivity behavior in these countries have focused almost exclusively on
the effect of various factors on firm-level productivity, and while the between-firm
reallocation of jobs has also been investigated, there has been little attention to other forms of
reallocation or to the possible productivity consequences.6 In this paper, we examine the
reallocation not only of jobs, but also of output, capital, and an input index, and we estimate
the extent to which reallocation has contributed to productivity growth using large samples of
firms observed before and after the policy reforms were implemented, focusing on the Soviet
(1985-92) and transition (1993-1998) periods.7
To further motivate our comparative analysis of productivity developments in the
Soviet Union and in transitional Russia and Ukraine, Section 2 provides a brief discussion of
Soviet planning, the different economic reform programs adopted in the two successor
countries, and their possible implications for the magnitude and productivity contributions of
resource reallocation. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4 the measurement methods.
Section 5 presents the results of our analysis, while Section 6 contains concluding remarks.

U.S. and Canadian data in Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998). Our data have the unusual advantages not
only of fully consistent coverage and definitions across countries and time, but also a common starting point that
facilitates an analysis of the changes in behavior following the adoption of different reform programs.
5
We also present the results of a method suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996), and we draw upon Liu and
Tybout’s (1996) suggestion of the input index as the appropriate weight in the decomposition. Other references
within the literature on which we build are listed in footnotes 1 and 2 and are discussed further below.
6
Djankov and Murrell (2002) review studies of firm-level restructuring in various transition economies.
Acquisti and Lehmann (2000), Bilsen and Konings (1998), Brown and Earle (2002a, 2002b, 2003), Faggio and
Konings (1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003), Kapeliushnikov (1997), Konings, Lehmann, and Schaffer
(1996), and Konings, Kupets, and Lehmann (2003) study job flows using firm or establishment-level data, and
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) and Jurajda and Terrell (2000, 2003) analyze individual work histories.
7
The years 1993-98 are used for the transition period, because we are unable to observe exit between 1992 and
1993 or entry between 1998 and 2000 in the Ukrainian data.
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2. The Soviet Economy, Post-Soviet Reforms, and Implications for
Productivity-Enhancing Reallocation
How would one expect reallocation and productivity patterns to look during the
Soviet period?

Under central planning, most variables that we think of as business

decisions—output, product variety, prices, technology, wages, investment, exit, and entry—
were either specifically planned or indirectly controlled.8 Enterprises had strong incentives to
meet planned output targets, but little incentive to contain costs, to innovate, or to produce
goods of value. There was no effective competition, and imports were tightly regulated.
Thus, the usual factors that might be supposed to influence reallocation and productivity were
largely absent.
The entry of new enterprises and shutdown of existing entities were determined solely
by planners. For continuing enterprises, new capital investments and technologies were
among the most tightly planned activities, both due to the priority placed on impressive
projects and because of the need to stanch enterprises’ perpetual “investment hunger”
(Kornai, 1992). Concerning employment, worker mobility was restricted by a number of
practices, and enterprises had rather little discretion in their decisions on employment.9
Sometimes employment levels were fixed explicitly, but the central planners’ usual method
of constraining employment, particularly in the later Soviet period, was to set a maximum
fund available for an enterprise’s total wage bill while specifying wage rates according to just
a few criteria, such as occupation and industry. There were also constraints on the ability of
enterprises to fire workers, although layoffs were not completely unknown.

Arguably,

however, the constraints on employment were due more to the planners’ fear of excessive
hiring than of unemployment, as a number of factors—including soft budget constraints,
planned output targets, and unreliable input supplies—combined to produce excess demand
for labor (Kornai, 1992).
How well did the socialist planners do in allocating resources across alternative uses?
Frequently the objectives of the plan included political objectives, among them the prestige of
rapid industrialization and of large, impressive projects, but the planners were also concerned
8

For a comprehensive overview of the socialist system and early partial reforms, see Kornai (1992). The term
“centrally planned” is a partial misnomer, because not every economic decision was set centrally, but we use it
as a convenient label. Also note that some decentralizing reforms were adopted under the rubric of perestroika
from late 1988, complicating matters further, but these reforms were partial and tentative, paling compared with
the later transformation of policies; moreover our data suggest that the “Soviet period” of 1985-1991 was
relatively homogeneous compared with the dramatic changes in behavior that occurred subsequently.
9
For a discussion of labor allocation in the Soviet Union, see Granick (1987). Gregory and Collier (1988)
discuss Soviet unemployment, which appears to have been very low (although non-zero).
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with output and thus with productive efficiency. Besides having to overcome the political
objectives and the whims of the Communist Party leaders, however, a major problem in
implementing the efficiency objective was lack of information, itself due to inherent features
of the system: fixed prices and wages, and perverse incentives discouraging innovation and
revelation of information on productive capacities.
This discussion implies that the incentives and frictions of the socialist system might
create very different patterns of reallocation and productivity compared to those that have
been documented in developed market economies. Planners had many concerns other than
efficiency, and even if they devoted some effort to reallocating resources from lower
productivity to higher productivity enterprises, lack of information would have hindered them
from doing so. The degree to which planners were successful at productivity-enhancing
reallocation may have been correlated with market structure if more dispersed structure
provided greater information about production possibilities, but there was little effective
competitive pressure in the usual market sense, and of course there was no private ownership.
Thus, while it seems unlikely that the planners would have been very successful, how they
actually performed is an empirical question—a very interesting one that we can address with
our data.
Turning to the transition, the factors affecting reallocation and productivity would
seem to be quite different from those under central planning. New enterprises can be started
up by entrepreneurs, and old ones can be shut down by their owners. The reduction of
constraints on hiring, firing, and investment leaves enterprises free to choose their own
employment and capital levels in principle, as liberalization more broadly permits
enterprises—even those remaining in state ownership—to make most decisions
autonomously and provides some incentives to do so. The extent to which enterprises
actually adjust and improve productivity in response to changes in their environment,
however, is likely to be a function of such factors as the strength of competitive pressures, the
objectives of the state or new owners, the effectiveness of corporate governance by the
owners, and the information conveyed by prices and wages. These factors in turn are
influenced by the specific policies of liberalization, privatization, and stabilization that were
adopted to initiate the transition to a market economy (e.g., Lipton and Sachs, 1990;
Blanchard et al., 1991).
The pace and design of such reforms after the break-up of the Soviet Union differed
substantially between Russia and Ukraine, the two largest Soviet successor states. Although
the policy changes in both were rapid and radical by the standards of most countries, Ukraine
6

by all accounts initially followed a more “gradualist” path than its larger neighbor in the early
and mid 1990s, while by the end of the decade there appears to have been substantial
convergence in policies. The World Bank (1996), for instance, ranked transition economies
according to the “extent of economic liberalization,” placing Russia almost at the top (just
behind Kyrgyzstan) of the CIS countries, in front of Bulgaria, and well ahead of China and
Vietnam. Ukraine’s rank was considerably lower, placing it in the “least advanced” group of
reformers together with Belarus and most of the Central Asian Republics.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides other
ratings of “progress in transition” along several different dimensions and in a time series from
1992 to 2001. The scale for each dimension is from 1 (denoting “unreformed”) to 4.3
(denoting a “market economy standard”). The 1992 scores given for both price liberalization
and foreign exchange and trade liberalization were 3.0 for Russia and 1.0 for Ukraine. Only
in 1995 did Ukraine’s score rise to 3.0 (EBRD, 1998), converging with Russia’s.10
Concerning privatization, both countries used some form of voucher privatization
method with substantial preferences for employees, but Russia’s pace was much faster. Most
Russian industrial enterprises had been majority privatized firms by July 1994, while Ukraine
proceeded much more gradually. Moreover, insider buyouts and collective worker ownership
were still more important in Ukraine than in Russia.11 Already in 1992, the EBRD (2001)
awarded Russia a score of 2.0 for large privatization, while Ukraine received only 1.0.
Russia’s score reached 3.0 in 1993 and 3.3 in 1997 (the same as Poland, and ahead of
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania), while Ukraine’s was 2.3. In 2000, the Ukrainian
privatization score rose to 2.7, just behind Russia’s.
The EBRD (1998) also estimated that the private sector in 1993 already accounted for
40 percent of Russian GDP but only 15 percent of Ukraine’s. In 1998, the figure was 70
percent in Russia, toward the top end of all transitional economies, and it had jumped to 55
percent in Ukraine. By 2000, the estimate for Ukraine reached 60 percent, again showing
convergence toward Russia.
Concerning stabilization, while the reported price inflation in Russia reached high
rates by any standards, it pales in comparison to Ukraine’s hyperinflation during most of this

10

The EBRD does not provide ratings for labor market liberalization, but anecdotal evidence indicates that this
process has also been somewhat uneven in the successor states, in particular as local governments have
frequently attempted to interfere with mass layoffs and with inward migration through systems of permits
(propiski). See Gimpelson and Lippoldt (2001) and Kapeliushnikov (2001) for detailed discussions of Russian
labor market behavior and policies.
11
See IMF (1999), Estrin and Rosevear (1999), or Pivovarsky (2001) for discussions of privatization in Ukraine,
and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) or Earle and Estrin (1997) for Russia.
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period: cumulating the annual CPI inflation reported in EBRD (2001) for the years 1992–
2000 yields a total price increase of 9,442 percent in Russia and 108,664 percent in
Ukraine.12 By the late 1990s, however, official inflation rates were much more similar in the
two countries (for instance, 14.8 percent in Russia and 15.9 percent in Ukraine in 1997).
Regardless of the exact figures, which are certainly subject to measurement errors and
disputes, the clearly different pattern of policy choices in the two countries suggests an
interesting set of comparative hypotheses. If a quicker and more effective implementation of
transitional policies tends to stimulate productivity-enhancing reallocation, then Ukraine’s
gradualist policy is likely to be reflected in a slower increase in the contribution of this factor
to productivity growth.

The effects of private ownership and of product and labor market

competition are also likely to be stronger in more rapidly reforming Russia, due to the greater
levels of inside ownership and less rapid liberalization in Ukraine.13
A final consideration concerns the institutional environment in both Russia and
Ukraine. Despite the rapid pace of liberalization in both countries, many observers have
noted continued government intervention that may slow productivity-enhancing reallocation.
For instance, there have been frequent instances of direct subsidization and other forms of
support for weak and failing enterprises, while discriminatory taxes, bureaucratic
interference, poor contract enforcement, and uncertain property rights protection have
impeded those that are more successful (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Aslund, Boone, and
Johnson, 1996). This suggests that both countries could be subject to “sclerosis” (Caballero
and Hammour, 1996, 2000), in which less productive resources remain employed due to
market imperfections and government policies, while the creation of more productive
matches of resources and enterprises is impeded. Unlike privatization and liberalization,
these institutional factors cannot be measured at the enterprise level, but they may tend to
attenuate the magnitude of reallocation and its contributions to productivity growth in both
countries.

12
According to Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002), Ukraine’s experience meets the classic definition of
hyperinflation from April 1991 to November 1994, the second longest period of hyperinflation in postwar
history.
13
An alternative possibility is that more cautious, gradual policies are more successful at stimulating productive
reallocation, and that overly rushed transitional programs lead to unemployment rather than genuine
reallocation, as in the literature on the optimal speed of transition (see, e.g., Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Boeri
and Terrell, 2002), or in Caballero and Hammour’s (1996) discussion of “hyperkinesis.” We discuss the
possibility that resource flows are either unassociated or negatively associated with productivity growth below.
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3. Data
The basic sources for the firm panel data in this study are annual industrial registries
provided by the State Committees for Statistics in Russia (the Goskomstat) and Ukraine (the
Derzhkomstat).14 During the Soviet period, these two statistical agencies were both parts of a
single organization (also called the Goskomstat), and they have kept essentially identical
reporting procedures for the industrial registries that they have continued to maintain. Thus,
the data are not beset by the problems of comparability plaguing many cross-countries studies
using micro-data.

The definitions of employment, capital, output, and industrial

classification (OKONKh) are identical in Russia and Ukraine, the same as they were in the
Soviet Union.15

One exception to this discussion concerns the definition of private

ownership, but we are able to handle this by bringing in an additional data source for
Ukraine. This procedure and the definitions of all variables are given in detail below.16
The coverages of the two countries’ registries are also quite comparable. In Soviet
Russia, the data include the universe of civilian industrial enterprises, while after 1991 the
coverage is supposed to be all industrial firms with more than 100 employees plus those that
are more than 25 percent owned by the state and/or by legal entities that are themselves
included in the registry.17 Because most industrial firms are large and nearly all of them were
state-owned in 1992, the coverage is very high in 1992: the firms in the Russian registry
accounted for 90.5 percent of officially reported total industrial employment, while the
Ukrainian covered 94.1 percent in that year.

The coverage rate in relation to official

employment declined somewhat thereafter, falling by the year 2000 to 69.8 percent in Russia

14
The Russian industrial registries were also supplemented by information from registries compiled separately,
including special registries on joint ventures, and the Ukrainian registries were supplemented by State Property
Committee data on ownership.
15
For the purpose of comparing our results with those from other studies, we should note that, similar to many
other sources in East European economies, the employment concept in our data is an annual average rather than
referring to a particular date or month, and it excludes “nonindustrial personnel” (chiefly, workers providing
social benefits to employees).
16
The units of observation in these data are firms, except for multi-plant entities where individual plants are
listed as “subsidiaries” (dochernye predpriyatiya or “daughter companies”). Apparently most but not all cases
of multiple plants are treated in this way: the 1993 registry contains a variable indicating the number of plants,
which equals 1 in 99.91 percent of the 18,121 nonmissing cases. Thus, our discussion refers to firms, plants,
establishments, and business units interchangeably. Note also that, to avoid double-counting, we have dropped
the consolidated records of entities with subsidiaries from the analysis.
17
Enterprises subordinated to the State Committee for the Defense Industry are excluded prior to 1992 and after
1998. See Earle and Komarov (2001) for some discussion of this sector.
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and 85.2 percent in Ukraine.18 No doubt the decline is due partially to the entrance of new
small firms owned by individuals, since the registries do not include such entities.19
The data are strongest, therefore, when used in a before-and-after analysis of the “old”
firms inherited from the Soviet Union. All state-owned and privatized firms are included
regardless of size and reorganization (split-ups and spin-offs), because the privatization
process frequently resulted in legal entities (including the state) ending up with substantial
shareholdings (Earle and Estrin, 1997). As there have been few cases of genuine shutdowns
in these countries (those bankruptcies that have taken place typically involving transfers of
control), our data cover nearly all the manufacturing assets inherited from the socialist
system. At the same time, our analysis includes cases of entry and exit, probably due in most
cases to reorganization rather than genuine startup or shutdown, but in fact all of these taken
together account for a relatively minor fraction of total resource flows.20
Although the registries cover firms from all of the industrial sectors, we restrict the
analysis in this paper to firms in manufacturing industries, eliminating electric utilities,
mining and industrial services, in order to improve comparability with other studies. We also
exclude firms classified as “public organizations,” which include nonprofit firms and those
belonging to the ministry of culture, the environment, health, or the interior (the databases
contain a number of prison-based firms).
To eliminate implausible outliers, we excluded observations in the top and bottom one
percent of the labor and multifactor productivity distributions, as these are likely to be related
to problems in coding of data rather than to real changes. Finally, the sample is reduced due
to missing values for employment, capital, and output, and those for the regressions on
employer characteristics are reduced because of missing values in the latter set of variables.
Table 1 shows the numbers of observations associated with each of these sample construction
procedures.

18
The official figures on industrial employment should be taken with some caution, as they are compiled not
only on the basis of the same registries that we study in this paper but also from a survey of nonregistry firms.
If the latter results in an overstatement of nonregistry employment, for example, then our calculation of the
coverage of the registries will be understated.
19
A strong positive correlation of age and size is of course not surprising, and Richter and Schaffer (1996)
provide evidence that new private Russian manufacturing firms in 1994 were much smaller than their stateowned and privatized counterparts: over half of the new firms in their sample had 50 or fewer employees and
fewer than 10 percent had more than 200, the breakpoints provided in their analysis (p. 257). By contrast, fewer
than 4 percent of old firms (and a trivial fraction of total employment) were in the smallest size category (<51).
About ten percentage points of the decline in Russian coverage, however, is due to the exclusion of most
military enterprises from the registry after 1998.
20
The size and ownership selection criteria for the registry imply that observed entrants are more likely to
represent reorganizations of existing assets than startups from scratch. The relatively small size of these firms
implies, however, that they account for a small fraction of all flows.
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Our data cleaning and preparation procedures paid a great deal of attention to
longitudinal links across firms. All of our data sources included not only an identifying code
for the firm, but also name and address, information which we used together with industry,
region, and size to link firms that had exited the registry with firms that had entered in any
given year. In order to eliminate spurious exits and entrances, we eliminated employment
changes associated with firms that exit and then re-enter, those in regions that are completely
missing in one of the two adjacent years, those in industries with implausibly high entry or
exit rates in that year (suggesting a change in sample coverage), and those associated with
firms that were members of Soviet-era production associations or that belong to multiestablishment firms.21
The data also have some important limitations, some of which are common to many
empirical studies. The available measures of key variables, for example, are not always
ideal:

We do not measure value-added, but only gross output.

Hours of work are

unavailable, and only the contribution of part-time multiple job-holders is measured in fulltime equivalents; other worker types are measured only by number of employees, and the
data only include a single employment figure per firm in both countries.22 The data include
no measures of material or other costs. Still more problems arise in comparing the pre- and
post-transition situations. During the central planning period, prices were set by planners,
affecting both the output and the capital measures, while after liberalization market forces
started to work. The farther the output from a final good, the more dubious its measure in
value terms, so the capital measures may be especially dubious. The nature of physical
output changed as planners’ emphasis on quantity targets lost influence and consumer
preferences regarding quality became more important. Reporting practices may also have
changed, as managerial incentives tended to result in exaggerated output under planning,
while tax avoidance leads to understatement during the transition.
These considerations suggest that productivity levels are in some sense incomparable
between the planning and transition periods, but our method requires no such comparisons:
we are concerned with the reallocation of resources within narrowly defined industries
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The reason for excluding production association entry and exit during the Soviet period and multiestablishment firm entry and exit during the transition period is that many of these firms report inconsistently in
the data. In one year a consolidated entity may appear, in the next each of the establishments may report
separately, or vice versa. These exclusion rules result in a conservative bias. Of course some production
associations may be starting new establishments or closing others down, and there may be some true entry and
exit in industries with implausibly high rates and in regions that enter and exit the dataset.
22
The Russian data include both production and nonproduction worker series (or concepts similar to these), but
the Ukrainian do not.
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conditional on relative productivity in the previous year.

Our estimates of relative

productivity also rely on within-year, within-industry estimates of production functions, and
we maintain no assumptions about a constant form of the production function across years
and industries. This approach also ameliorates some of the input measurement difficulties
described above, as all we need assume is that certain ratios – of value-added to output, of
hours to employment, of material inputs to other inputs, and of true capital and output to
reported capital and output, respectively – are roughly constant across the firms operating
within an industry in a given year. Finally, we examine alternative measures of productivity
(labor productivity and multifactor productivity calculated using different methods) to
examine the robustness of our finding with respect to a variety of specifications.
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the sample that we focus on in this paper:
ownership, domestic product market, concentration, labor market concentration, and import
competition from the OECD, from the former Soviet Republics now in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and from Less Developed Countries (LDCs). The table also
contains the mean employment, capital stock, output and input index, as well as their
standard deviations. In Russia, information on ownership is available for each firm-year only
in the form of a dummy variable for majority private ownership, Private; thus we define a
similar dummy for Ukraine based on information concerning share ownership.23 During the
Soviet period, the mean of this variable is of course zero, but consistent with the evaluations
of the international financial institutions, discussed in Section 2 above, a much larger fraction
of Russian enterprises was majority private in the reform period: 67 percent of firm-year
observations, compared with 35 percent in Ukraine. Private is included in the regression as
the value for year t-1 to explain flows from year t-1 to year t.
To control for preprivatization behavior in the regressions, we also define a dummy
variable Ever Private as equal to one if the firm is majority private by 2000, or by the last
year it appears in the database. The mean of this variable is also shown in Table 2. Including
Ever Private in the regressions implies that the Private effect is estimated by regressionadjusted difference-in-differences.24
Two dimensions of competitive pressure, domestic product market and local labor
market, are measured as dispersion indices.

Our measure of domestic product market

dispersion follows Brown and Earle’s (2001) method of using data at both the national and
regional levels to account for different geographic market sizes across industries.
23
24

See the Appendix for detailed definitions of the variables.
The ownership status of firms in these data does not shift back from private to state ownership.
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The

premise of the method is that the geographic scope of the market in an industry is reflected in
the degree to which producers in the industry are located across different regions of the
country. For instance, an industry with member firms in all regions is likely to have regional
markets, and an industry with firms in only a few regions is likely to be a national market.
To implement a mixed dispersion measure, we first calculate the opposite of the natural
logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for each industry at the regional and national
levels. These regional and national dispersion measures are then combined into a single
index, Product Market Dispersion, by taking their weighted sum, where the weight on the
regional dispersion measure is the proportion of regions with at least one firm in industry j in
year t, and the weight on the national dispersion measure is one minus this proportion. To
measure local Labor Market Dispersion, we similarly calculate the opposite of the natural
logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for local industrial employment concentration
in each municipality in Russia and Ukraine.
The three import measures pertain to import penetration from the OECD, LDC’s, and
CIS countries, respectively. These are measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus import
penetration, where the latter is 100*imports/(output+imports-exports) at the 5-digit OKONKh
level.
Table 2 provides the means and standard deviations of these measures, showing
somewhat lower product market dispersion, but higher import penetration in Ukraine than in
Russia. The Labor Market Dispersion measures are similar in both countries. The product
and labor market dispersion and import penetration indices from year t-1 are included in the
regressions to explain flows between years t-1 and t. Further details on the variable sources
and definitions are given in the Appendix.
4. Measurement Procedures
Our basic approach is to compute firm-level labor (LP) and multifactor (MFP)
productivity measures,25 aggregate them into a constructed aggregate productivity for each
year and industry, and then estimate the effect of private ownership and product and labor
market dispersion for components of the aggregation.26 Labor productivity is calculated as
the log of gross output divided by number of employees. Our measure of MFP is similar to
25

We employ both labor and multifactor productivity to check for robustness. Labor productivity has the
disadvantage of ignoring capital inputs, while multifactor productivity suffers from the problem that capital is
measured with considerable error.
26
This approach focuses on the consequences for average industry productivity of within-industry reallocation
of input and output shares, because productivity differentials across industries are very difficult to measure.
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that used by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), our choice of weights for aggregating
productivity follows Liu and Tybout (1996), and our decomposition methods are drawn from
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) and Olley and Pakes (1996).27 Our estimation of the
ownership and market structure effects makes use of regression methods we have developed
for this purpose. This section lays out our procedures with respect to each of these parts of
the analysis.
Concerning the multifactor productivity measure, we assume an industry-specific
Cobb-Douglas relationship between output (X) and two inputs, capital (K) and labor (L):
α

X eit = Peiτ K eit i Leit

βi

(1)

where Peiτ is the firm-specific Hicks-neutral MFP of firm e in industry i in year τ. In much of
the analysis we consider two distinct periods for the analysis in this paper: 1985-1992
(Soviet) and 1993-1998 (reform).

The function is estimated separately for each of 41

industries in two-year periods, using constant prices in the two years.
Construction of aggregate productivity measures involves summing firm-level
measures to the industry level:
Pit = ∑ Seit Peit ,

(2)

e

where Pit is average productivity of sector i in year t, Seit is the weight (share) of firm e in
industry i and year t, and Peit is the productivity of enterprise e in sector i in year t. The
construction of aggregate industry MFP follows Liu and Tybout (1996) in using the estimated
input index, derived from equation (1):
⎛
⎜ K αi L βi
Pit = ∑ ⎜ eit αi eit βi
e ⎜ ∑ K eit Leit
⎝ e

⎞
⎟
⎟ Peit ,
⎟
⎠

(3)

The basic decomposition, following Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001),
expresses the change in aggregate industry productivity, ∆Pit, as follows:

∆Pit = ∑set−1∆pet + ∑( pet−1 − Pit−1 )∆set + ∑∆pet∆set + ∑set ( pet − Pit−1 ) − ∑set−1( pet−1 − Pit−1 ) . (4)
e∈C

e∈C

e∈C

e∈N

e∈X

The firm term in (4) measures the average change in firm productivity holding composition
constant at its previous year structure, in order to distinguish average productivity growth

Brown and Earle (2002b) consider between-industry job reallocation and its consequences for aggregate labor
productivity growth.
27
We also investigated a decomposition developed by Griliches and Regev (1995), which produces results that
are very similar to those reported here and are available on request.
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from composition effects. This term may reflect firm restructuring and deterioration as well
as mismeasured price and quality changes. The second term measures the between-firm
(within-sector) reallocational effect, the covariance of share changes with the previous year
deviation of enterprise productivity from the industry mean. The third term measures the
intrasectoral covariance of productivity and compositional changes, the “cross” effect, while
the fourth and fifth represent the contributions of entry (N) and exit (X), respectively.
We also employ an alternative productivity decomposition methodology, due to Olley
and Pakes (1996).

This approach involves a cross-sectional decomposition of labor

productivity for each industry:
Pit = Pit + ∑ (Seit − Sit )(Peit − Pit ) ,

(5)

e

where the overbar indicates the unweighted average across firms in the industry. The first
term is the unweighted average of firm productivity, and the second term, “cross,” reflects the
extent to which activity is disproportionately located in high productivity firms (if the term is
positive) or low productivity firms (if the term is negative). Changes in the ratio of the cross
term to aggregate productivity reflect the extent to which the allocation of activity has
become more or less productivity-enhancing over time.

An advantage of this method

compared to Equation (4) is that differences in productivity cross-sectionally are less affected
by measurement error and transitory shocks.
How are firm-level variables related to policy changes associated with the strength of
the reallocation-productivity relationship?

We investigate this with respect to the total

reallocation effect and then specifically to the exit effect. With respect to each, we propose a
regression method for estimating the effects of private ownership and product and labor
market competition.28 To motivate our method, it is useful to express the between-firm effect
in Equation (4) as a covariance, namely as

∑ S ∑ ∆S ( P
it −1

i

eit

eit −1

− Pit −1 ) = n cov(S it −1 ∆S eit , Peit −1 − Pit −1 )

(6)

e

28
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) and Pavcnik (2002) analyze the effects of import liberalization on productivity
growth by comparing intrasectoral reallocation effects across industries; they find larger effects in traded than in
nontraded goods sectors. Our regression methods permit us to consider several policies simultaneously, control
for other factors, and distinguish policy effects at both the firm and industry levels.
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where n refers to the total number of sampled firms in all industries and the notation is
otherwise the same as in Equation (4).29 The effect may also be computed as β̂ from the
following OLS regression:
⎛
⎞
Peit −1 − Pit −1
⎟⎟ + uˆ eit ,
S it −1 ∆S eit = αˆ + βˆ ⎜⎜
⎝ n var(Peit −1 − Pit −1 ) ⎠

(7)

where α̂ is an estimated intercept and uˆeit is an estimated residual. In this equation, β̂ can
be interpreted as the responsiveness of the firm’s size adjustment to its relative performance
within its industry, scaled so that the responsiveness is measured in terms of its contribution
to aggregate productivity growth: if markets work well to reallocate resources across firms,
then β̂ will be high, while if the reallocation process is sclerotic, then β̂ will be low.30

The usefulness of these expressions lies in the possibility to express βˆ as a function of
other variables, including country, time period, and firm characteristics, and thus to compute
the impact of changes in those variables on the extent of productivity-enhancing reallocation.
As a first exercise, we permit β̂ to vary only across the three country-periods in our data
(also including these three dummy variables into the intercept).
Our main interest concerns the effects of privatization and liberalization policies on
productivity-enhancing reallocation within sectors.

For this purpose, we permit β̂ in

Equation (7) to vary with the firm-level variables Ever Private, Private, Product Market
Dispersion, Labor Market Dispersion, OECD Import Penetration, and LDC Import
Penetration. These interaction effects are further permitted to vary by country and time

period, so that we may assess any fluctuations over time in the relationships. The inclusion
of the Ever Private variable controls for the possibility of selection bias in the privatization
process, resulting in a regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimator for the effect of
private ownership on the extent to which reallocation is productivity-enhancing. These
specifications permit an assessment of the effects of corporate governance and effective
market competition in encouraging more productive firms to expand relative to less
productive ones within each industry.

29
One difference is that entering and exiting firms are included here along with continuing firms, so as to
estimate the total reallocation effect.
30
This interpretation could also be motivated by models of industry dynamics and selection, such as those of
Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
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We also undertake a similar analysis of the effect of exit, based on the final term in
Equation (4):

∑ s (p

e∈X

et −1

et −1

− Pit −1 ) . Our procedure is to estimate the probability of exit, using

a probit model, on the relative productivity of the firm interacted with our policy proxies of
interest. We also control for firm size using log employment. Together with the analysis of
the between-firm effect for continuing entities, this analysis sheds light on whether
privatization and competition are associated with stronger productivity-enhancing effects of
resource reallocation. The results of these investigations are described in the next section.

5. Results
We begin by providing basic information on the magnitudes of resource flows,
reporting the creation (C), destruction (D), reallocation (R), net change (NC), and excess
reallocation (XR) rates for employment, capital stock, input index, and output, separately for
each variable by country and time period.31 The calculations follow the methods of Davis
and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1999) for measuring job flows, except that we use regression
procedures in order to calculate standard errors and to draw inferences concerning the
statistical significance of Russia-Ukraine differences.32

The results, shown in Table 3,

demonstrate that there were very low reallocation rates for output, labor, capital, and the
input index during the Soviet period. In the transition period, however, all of these rates
increase greatly. Both the input and output rates tend to rise somewhat faster and reach
higher levels in Russia than they do in Ukraine, though only the input rate difference is
statistically significant.
As described above, our analysis of the productivity consequences of these resource
flows focuses on changes in the industry shares of business units, thus on excess reallocation
within industries. What fraction of excess reallocation is accounted for by within-industry
flows? For this purpose, we rely on a methodology introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) to compute the fraction of excess reallocation that takes place within 5-digit
industries. Previous research, summarized by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for a number of
countries, has consistently found that the within-industry component predominates, in every
case accounting for at least 80 percent of total excess reallocation. The figures for Russia and
Ukraine in Table 4 imply a larger role for between-industry shifts; capital flows, particularly
31

Creation is defined as the change in growing firms, destruction as the absolute value of the change in
declining firms, reallocation as the sum of creation and destruction, net change as the difference, and excess
reallocation as reallocation minus the absolute value of net change.
32
Our regression methods are described more fully in Brown and Earle (2002b). Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Krizan (2001) report creation and destruction rates for output and capital.

17

in transition Russia, are estimated to be predominantly between rather than within. For job
and output reallocation in both countries, and for the input index in Russia, within-industry
flows predominate.
With this background on the magnitude of reallocation involved, we turn to the results
from estimating the decompositions based on Equations (4) and (5), which appear in Table 5
and in the accompanying Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, and 2b.

Reallocation was labor

productivity-neutral, but slightly multifactor productivity-enhancing during the Soviet
period.33 Regardless of whether one uses labor or multifactor productivity, however,
reallocation clearly became more productive in transition Russia. Reallocation is not
productive until 1995 (multifactor productivity) or 1996 (labor productivity) in Ukraine. This
could indicate that Ukraine’s reallocation did not become productive until later in the
transition compared to Russia, though one would need data from earlier years in Ukraine to
be sure. But during the reform period overall, Ukraine’s reallocation appears to be at least as
productive as Russia’s. The labor productivity results suggest that entry reduces and exit
enhances labor productivity, with only a slight positive net entry effect in both countries in
transition. Entry has basically no effect and exit has a slight positive effect on multifactor
productivity. So the vast majority of the productive reallocation has come from changes in
shares of continuing firms.34 This may be changing over time, though, as the figures show an
increasingly positive exit effect in both countries.
Figures 2a and 2b show results using the cross-sectional decomposition from equation
(5). We display the differences between cross terms across year pairs, excluding spurious
entry and exit during the two years. A larger cross term in one year compared to the previous
year would suggest that resources are moving toward more productive firms. As with the
previous decomposition, these results suggest that reallocation has been more productive in
the reform period compared to the Soviet period, and that it has been similarly productive in
Russia and Ukraine.
Since the Russian sample coverage changes across time, one may be concerned about
the degree to which the differences in results across the Soviet and post-Soviet periods are
being driven by these changes. Table 6 addresses this issue. In the table, “2-period” refers to
firms present in the data in the 2 periods under consideration, while “1-period” refers to firms

33

The cross term (covariance between resource share change and within-firm productivity change) is only partly
a reallocation effect. The cross term is subsumed into the reallocation and within-firm effects in roughly equal
proportions in the Griliches and Regev (1995) decomposition.
34
Note that this decomposition measures only the immediate effect of entry, which is frequently negative in
market economies. We will examine longer-term effects below.
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present in only one of the two periods – thus, to changes in the sample. The increase in the
productivity of reallocation between continuing firms appears to be driven primarily by
changes in the behavior of firms that continue for both periods.
These results provide strong evidence that the change of economic system had major
implications for the pace of productivity-enhancing reallocation. Can the large increase be
associated with any particular reform policies, such as privatization and liberalization of
imports and of domestic product and labor markets? To provide some evidence on this
question, we turn to the estimated results from the random coefficient equation (7), displayed
in Table 7.35 Starting with privatization, we first note that the estimated coefficient on the
control variable Ever Private, which is a group effect that takes into account any fixed
differences between firms that become privatized and those that do not, suggests that firms
that would later be privatized have an only slightly greater tendency than those that would
remain state-owned to reallocate inputs within their sector productively; thus there is little
difference in preprivatization behavior. After the Russian firms were privatized, however,
the labor productivity results imply that productivity growth is raised by about 3.5 percentage
points relative to firms not yet privatized. In Ukraine, by contrast, privatization is estimated
to have an insignificant effect.
Turning to Product Market Dispersion, we find a negative relationship with the
productivity of intrasectoral reallocation in Ukraine and an insignificant relationship in
Russia. Concerning Labor Market Dispersion, the relationship with productivity appears to
be positive in each period when using MFP and insignificant when using LP. No systematic
effects are found from being exposed to more international competition, regardless of the
source.
Taken together, these results provide mixed evidence that the extent to which resource
reallocation enhances productivity growth may indeed be a function of the economic policy
and institutional environment. In the Soviet period, firms to be privatized exhibited little
difference (in this sense) from those destined to remain state-owned. After privatization took
place, there was a sharp jump in the contribution of privatized firms to productivityenhancing reallocation in Russia, but no such effect can be detected in Ukraine, where
privatization was carried out much more gradually and with a stronger bias towards insider
giveaways. In contrast, the regressions provide little evidence that liberalizing reforms have
stimulated more productive reallocation.

35

The results are very similar when including only continuing firms.
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We now take a closer look at exit, which appeared in the decomposition results above
to provide an increasingly important contribution to productivity growth across time. One
may be concerned that the measured effect is due to a phenomenon analogous to an
“Ashenfelter dip,” where productivity suddenly falls once the firm knows it will exit. To
check this, in Figures 3a and 3b we compare the productivity of exiting firms for five years
prior to exit with a consistent panel of survivors. Though there is a dip in productivity in the
last year, productivity was already lower in firms that would later exit well before the exit
year, so exit appears to be providing a real contribution to aggregate productivity.
Table 8 focuses on how policies may affect the productivity of exit. The table shows
estimated exit probits, where the coefficient on relative productivity is again permitted to
vary with the set of firm characteristics representing measurable policies of interest.
Privatization is associated with exit of less productive enterprises in both countries. No
association between product market dispersion and the exit-productivity relationship is found.
The relationship with labor market dispersion is unexpectedly positive in both countries,
however, which taken at face value would imply that operating in a more competitive labor
market would raise the probability that firms with above-average productivity would exit.
LDC and CIS imports also have an unexpected positive sign in Ukraine. So, as with the
earlier regressions, we find evidence that privatization (this time in both countries) has
contributed to more productive reallocation, but not liberalization.
The final step in our analysis focuses on the selection and learning processes of
entrants relative to incumbents during the transition period. For this purpose, Table 9
compares the levels of LP and MFP for entrants and incumbents in the year of entry,
differentiating between entrants and incumbents that would exit and those that would still be
producing three years later. Surviving incumbents is the omitted category. Nonsurviving
incumbents exhibit statistically significantly lower productivity than surviving incumbents in
all specifications except MP in Ukraine. Nonsurviving entrants have lower labor productivity
than surviving incumbents, but no statistically significant difference is found when using MP.
Surviving entrants also show lower LP, but not MP, than surviving incumbents.

The

differences in the LP and MP results may be explained by lower capital intensity among
entrants, possibly due to credit constraints. When comparing nonsurviving to surviving
entrants, we find that Russian nonsurviving entrants have statistically significantly (at the 5%
level) lower LP than surviving entrants, but not MP. Strangely, nonsurviving Ukrainian
entrants are found to have statistically significantly (at the 5% level) MP. Table 9 also reports
regressions dividing nonsurviving entrants and incumbents by exit year. One might expect
20

relative productivity to be less negative for those exiting further in the future, but the results
show no systematic pattern.
We then test for whether learning takes place among surviving entrants.36 Table 10
shows the results from regressions comparing the productivity of surviving entrants and
surviving incumbents three years after the entrance year. Entrants have now caught up to
incumbents in LP and have surpassed them in MP in both countries. The results from tables
9 and 10 suggest that efficient selection is taking place among incumbents, but the evidence
is weaker regarding selection among entrants. Russia exhibits more consistent selection
effects than Ukraine. Strong evidence of learning by entrants is found in both countries, so
the longer-run effect of entry on aggregate productivity appears to be positive.
6. Conclusion

Research on microeconomic productivity developments in the transition economies
has focused almost entirely on the effect of various factors, most prominently privatization,
on the average firm's productivity level (or growth). This body of research on the “withinfirm effect” is large and has already achieved a status meriting lengthy review articles (e.g.,
Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002).

While this is no doubt an

important area for continued work, there has been a relative neglect of other microeconomic
mechanisms that affect aggregate productivity outcomes. Our research takes a very different
perspective, emphasizing instead the contribution to aggregate productivity growth of
reallocation across business units that display differential levels of productivity.
To describe the difference between these approaches in another way, the standard
literature has focused on the possibility for learning and restructuring to improve the
efficiency of firms. But what if such learning mechanisms are weak, for instance because of
inertia due to sunk organizational and physical capital? In the extreme case, managers may
have little chance to increase productivity, and as Nickell (1996) expressed it, the whole body
of research (on the effects of product market competition on firm-level productivity, in his
case) may have been “barking up the wrong tree.” An alternative point of view, the one we
adopt in this paper, takes such inertia as given and focuses on processes of selection rather
than learning.

Even if within-firm productivity is immutable, an effective selection

mechanism across firms may lead to productivity-enhancing entry, exit, and reallocation
across continuing firms. Managers may not be able to affect the productivity of their firms,
36

It may take time for entrants to discover their optimal factor mix, for example.
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but they may be able to perceive their relative efficiency levels, and, if they are responsive to
the associated market signals, they may downsize or expand appropriately.

We have

examined the role of privatization and liberalization policies in increasing this
responsiveness, thus in increasing the intensity of productivity-enhancing reallocation.
The microeconomic database we have assembled provides useful material for
investigating these questions. The data include nearly the universe of “old” industrial firms
inherited from the Soviet period, and the time series is long enough to include seven years of
data for Soviet Russia, ten years for post-Soviet Russia, and nine for Ukraine; we observe
privatized firms for several years before and after their change in ownership. A further,
unusual advantage of the data is that we face none of the vexing comparability issues
plaguing most cross-country studies of these issues or any involving enterprise behavior. The
sources for nearly all of our data originate in a single Soviet organization that was
subsequently split up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the sample coverage and
variable definitions are essentially identical in the two successor states. Our approach has not
been to provide a complete description of job and other resource flow patterns in these
economies, a task which is beyond the scope of our data, but rather to exploit the quasiexperimental situation of institutional and policy change and to focus on the set of enterprises
that experiences these changes. For this purpose, our manufacturing census data for the
inherited sector of medium and large enterprises from 1985–2001 are well suited.
Our analysis finds extremely low rates of interfirm reallocation in Soviet Russia and a
negligible contribution of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth.

These results

contribute in an important way to our understanding of the poor performance of the Soviet
system, as they support an evolutionary view of the system’s drawbacks: while central
planning may have functioned adequately in a static environment requiring little active
reallocation of resources, it was much less effective in dynamic responsiveness to shocks
requiring learning and selection—weeding out less efficient activities and promoting those
that have become more productive.37
We also find that liberalizing reforms in the two largest Soviet successor states have
brought substantial increases in resource reallocation and in the productivity-enhancing
consequences of the reallocation process. The overall patterns are quite similar for the two
countries, despite the differences in their reform policies. Our examination of the effects of
privatization and competitive pressures from product and labor markets on the overall
37
Schumpeter (1942) was perhaps the first to emphasize the role of factor reallocation in capitalist growth. See
Murrell (1992) on the evolutionary view of central planning and reform.
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productivity-enhancing effect of resource reallocation shows a contribution by privatization
in Russia, but not in Ukraine, and little contribution from competitive pressure is found in
either economy, except possibly from local labor markets. Privatization in both countries is
found to encourage less productive firms to exit.
Ukraine’s transitional policies have frequently been labeled “gradualist,” compared to
Russia’s “shock therapy,” yet reforms in both countries have come in for severe criticism and
their macroeconomic performance records have shown rather similar patterns. Aggregate
output, for instance, displayed a similarly dismal trend for most of the 1990s, leading some
observers to question the value of privatization and liberalization.

The microeconomic

evidence presented here, however, is consistent with the view that reforms have stimulated
enterprise-level restructuring and reallocation in both countries, and that the reallocation
process has become productivity-enhancing. In the early transition, the reallocation effects
served to reduce the magnitude of productivity decline, and more recently they have
accounted for a major fraction of productivity growth.

Appendix: Variable Definitions and Construction
Capitalt is the average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise
by employment in year t. Capital stock is adjusted for revaluations, which take place at the
end of some years, using information on the end-of-year and beginning-of-year values. The
rank of capital intensity is expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most capitalintensive.
CIS Import Penetrationt is imports from CIS countries divided by (domestic output plus total
imports minus total exports) in year t in the five-digit OKONKh industry. The Russian trade
data come from Goskomstat except in 1997, when they come from the State Customs
Committee. The Ukrainian data come from Derzhkomstat.
Employmentt is the average number of “registered industrial production personnel” (including
both production and non-production workers, but excluding “nonindustrial personnel” chiefly
involved in providing employee benefits) in year t. The concept includes the full-time
equivalent number of part-time workers registered at another firm (“sovmestiteli”).
Ever Privatet is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in the year 2000
(or by the last year it appears in the data), 0 otherwise.
Labor Market Dispersiont = –ln(Herfindahl-Hirschman index of employment concentration
in the municipality in Russia and county [raion] in Ukraine) in year t, calculated using the
industrial registries. Our database includes firms in 3,655 municipalities in Russia and 642
raions in Ukraine.
Labor Productivityt = ln(Outputt/Employmentt).
LDC Import Penetrationt is imports from non-CIS, non-OECD countries divided by
(domestic output plus total imports minus total exports) in year t in the five-digit OKONKh
industry. The Russian trade data come from Goskomstat, except in 1997, when they come
from the State Customs Committee. The Ukrainian data come from Derzhkomstat.
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OECD Import Penetrationt is imports from OECD countries (not including East European
countries) divided by (domestic output plus total imports minus total exports) in year t in the
five-digit OKONKh industry. The Russian trade data come from Goskomstat, except in 1997,
when they come from the State Customs Committee. The Ukrainian data come from
Derzhkomstat.
Outputt is the value of gross output produced in year t, net of VAT and excise taxes,
expressed in constant prices in both countries. The nominal values were deflated using
implicit deflators calculated by dividing the growth in nominal output at the three-digit
OKONKh (ten-sector) level by a growth in physical volume index for Russia (Ukraine).38
Privatet is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in year t, and = 0
otherwise The ownership data upon which this is based for Russia are annual ownership
codes in the registries. For Ukraine we use annual State Property Committee data on the
percentage of shares in private hands. If a firm is not found in those data, we include it as a
state firm in all years if it has a state ownership code in the 2000 registry. Otherwise it is
excluded from this part of the analysis, since we do not know the percentage of shares that
are private. Note that the nature of the registry data (described above) implies that Private
refers to privatized, formerly state-owned entities.
Product Market Dispersiont is the product market dispersion measure in year t. Dispersion
indices at the regional (oblast) and national levels are obtained as –ln (Herfindahl-Hirschman
index of product market concentration in the five-digit OKONKh industry) at the regional
(oblast) and national level, respectively. A weighted average of these is constructed using the
proportion of regions with at least one enterprise in the five-digit industry in year t to weight
the national dispersion, and one minus this proportion to weight the regional dispersion
measure. Russia and Ukraine use the same industrial classification system throughout the
period. In Russia, there are 260 five-digit industries represented in the data while in Ukraine
there are 241. There are 82 Russian and 28 Ukrainian oblasts represented in the data. The
Russian figure is smaller than the total of 89 regions (“subjects of the Russian Federation”)
because several smaller districts (okrugi) are grouped together with surrounding regions, and
the database does not cover Chechnya and Ingushetia.
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Table 1
Numbers of Firm-Year Observations
Soviet
Reform
Reform
Russia
Russia
Ukraine
(1985-1992)
(1993-1998)
(1993-1998)
122,761
111,372
39,066
Total sample
106,159
111,879
39,032
Sample for job flow analysis
120,670
78,249
35,402
Sample for capital flow analysis
97,536
72,779
33,182
Sample for input index flow analysis
120,542
103,556
35,718
Sample for output flow analysis
97,132
97,987
34,374
Sample for labor productivity decomp.
97,539
72,658
33,175
Sample for MFP decomposition
79,346
72,171
20,210
Sample for between LP regs.
—
74,004
25,650
Sample for exit LP regressions
Note: The total sample includes all manufacturing, nonpublic organization firm-years in the database, regardless of missing values
for any variables. The samples for the job, capital, input index, and output flow calculations, and those for the productivity
decomposition and regressions, exclude missing values and a small number of outliers, as described in the text.
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Table 2
Firm Characteristics

Ever Private (dummy)

Soviet
Russia
0.774

Reform
Russia
0.801

Reform
Ukraine
0.688

Private (dummy)

0.000

0.667

0.349

Product Market Dispersion

2.058
(0.697)

1.865
(0.693)

1.650
(0.812)

Labor Market Dispersion

1.869
(1.278)

2.008
(1.330)

2.086
(0.928)

OECD Import Penetration

—

0.501
(0.833)

1.360
(1.458)

LDC Import Penetration

—

0.380
(0.804)

0.765
(1.054)

CIS Import Penetration

—

0.314
(0.654)

0.856
(1.264)

Employment

677
(2,287)

474
(1,781)

439
(1,267)

Capital

11,873
(53,026)

37,709
(2,012,849)

8,524
(54,502)

Input Index

4,838
(23,310)

5,738
(53,300)

8,706
(77,512)

20,416
2,340,000
81,310
(70,893)
(22,300,000)
(577,276)
Note: Means are shown for all variables, and standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown for continuous variables.
Definitions of all variables are described in the text, and the precise sources and computations are reported in the Appendix.
The means for the first seven variables are for the sample in Table 7 for labor productivity, and the means for the latter four
variables are from the samples in Table 3.
Output
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Table 3
Reallocation in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine
Ukraine
XR
N
C
D
R
NC
XR
Average Annual Job Flow Rates, By Period
3.29
6.10
9.38
-2.81
6.58
Soviet
106,159
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
(1985–92)
(0.22)
(0.15)
(0.29)
(0.24)
(0.44)
6.30* 13.57*
19.87
-7.28* 12.59*
4.63
17.04
21.68
-12.41
9.27
Reform
111,879
(0.41) (0.41)
(0.65)
(0.52)
(0.84)
(1993–98)
(0.21)
(0.37)
(0.44)
(0.40)
(0.41)
Average Annual Capital Flow Rates, By Period
10.32
4.72
15.04
5.60
9.44
Soviet
120,670
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
(1985–92)
(0.83)
(0.32)
(1.00)
(0.75)
(0.63)
12.29
3.71*
16.00*
8.58
7.42
27.32
39.12
66.43 -11.80
54.63
Reform
78,249
(1993–98)
(10.89)
(7.67) (15.08) (11.29) (21.78)
(1.49) (0.52)
(1.50)
(1.64)
(1.04)
Average Annual Input Index Flow Rates, By Period
5.79
7.70
13.49
-1.91
11.58
Soviet
97,536
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
(1985–92)
(0.43)
(0.33)
(0.53) (-3.46)
(0.86)
7.00
12.03
19.03
-5.03
14.00
6.95
8.31*
15.26*
-1.35
13.91
Reform
72,779
(1993–98)
(0.65)
(0.52)
(0.71)
(0.93)
(1.29)
(0.59) (1.11)
(1.22)
(1.29)
(1.17)
Average Annual Output Flow Rates, By Period
13.82
13.61
27.43
0.21
27.22
Soviet
120,542
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
(1985–92)
(0.85)
(0.37)
(0.87)
(0.22)
(0.74)
12.15
21.70
33.86
-9.55
24.31
11.80
26.22
38.02 -14.41
23.61
Reform
103,556
(0.99) (1.84)
(1.66)
(2.45)
(1.98)
(1993–98)
(0.97)
(2.45)
(2.77)
(2.50)
(1.94)
Note: The star (*) signifies that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian rate at the one percent level.
C

D

R

Russia
NC
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N
N.A.
39,032

N.A.
35,402

N.A.
33,182

N.A.
35,718

Table 4
Proportion of Excess Reallocation Within Industries

Total
Proportion

Russia
Proportion due to:
Continuing
Entering
Firms
Firms

Total
Proportion

Exiting
Firms

Ukraine
Proportion due to:
Continuing
Entering
Firms
Firms

Exiting
Firms

Job Flows
Soviet
(1985–92)
Reform
(1993–98)

0.7556

0.6307

0.1114

0.0135

0.8680

0.4679

0.3798

0.0203

Soviet
(1985–92)
Reform
(1993–98)

0.6331

0.5821

0.0170

Capital Flows
0.0340

0.3675

0.3147

0.0357

0.0170

Soviet
(1985–92)
Reform
(1993–98)

0.7690

0.6892

0.0667

Input Index Flows
0.0131

0.5959

0.4704

0.0976

0.0280

0.6895

0.5919

0.4549

0.3205

0.3416

0.0274

0.3113

0.0706

0.2099

0.3896

0.0488

0.0165

Output Flows
0.5965
0.5604
0.0315
0.0045
Soviet
(1985–92)
0.6348
0.5100
0.0818
0.0430
0.6093
0.5225
0.0717
0.0151
Reform
(1993–98)
Note: These are proportions of total excess reallocation occurring within five-digit industries. When an industry is declining, the total excess reallocation is
divided between continuing and entering firms’ contributions based on their proportions of creation in the sector. The total is divided between continuing and
exiting firms’ contributions based on their proportions of destruction in the sector when the industry is expanding.
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Table 5
Contribution of Reallocation to Productivity Growth

∑ ∆S (P
e∈C

Soviet Russia
(1985-92)
Reform Russia
(1993-98)
Reform Ukraine
(1993-98)

eit

eit −1

− Pit −1 )

∑ ∆P
e∈C

eit

∆S eit

∑ S (P

e∈ N

eit

eit

− Pit −1 ) − ∑ S eit −1 (Peit −1 − Pit −1 )
e∈ X

Labor Productivity
-0.08
0.07

0.14

-0.17

2.78

0.29

-0.71

2.63

-0.40

-0.38

Reallocation
Effect with Cross
Term

Reallocation
Effect without
Cross Term

-0.04

0.13

0.79

3.15

2.86

0.48

2.33

2.73

Multifactor Productivity
Soviet Russia
1.83
-2.04
0.03
0.13
-0.05
2.00
(1985-92)
Reform Russia
3.04
-2.16
-0.09
0.15
0.94
3.10
(1993-98)
Reform Ukraine
2.57
-0.78
0.02
0.35
2.16
2.94
(1993-98)
Note: The multifactor productivity figures show the results from applying Equation (4) in the text to firms in 41 industries, by country and time
period. The industry-level results are aggregated using annual average output weights.
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Figure 1a
Contribution of Reallocation to Russian Labor
Productivity Growth
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Figure 1b
Contribution of Reallocation to Ukrainian Labor
Productivity Growth
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Figure 1c
Contribution of Reallocation to Russian
Multifactor Productivity Growth
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Figure 1d
Contribution of Reallocation to Ukrainian
Multifactor Productivity Growth
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Figure 2a
Contribution of Reallocation to Labor Productivity
Growth (Cross-Sectional Method)

Note: These are differences between the cross-terms (the second term in equation 5) in year t and t-1. Firms disappearing in year t or appearing in year t, but which
are not exiting or entering according to the definitions used in this paper, are excluded so that data coverage changes do not drive the results.
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Multifactor Productivity
Growth

Figure 2b
Contribution of Reallocation to Multifactor
Productivity Growth (Cross-Sectional Method)
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Note: These are differences between the cross-terms (the second term in equation 5) in year t and t-1. Firms disappearing in year t or appearing in year t, but which are
not exiting or entering according to the definitions used in this paper, are excluded so that data coverage changes do not drive the results.
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Table 6
Breakdown of Productivity Terms into Contributions by Russian Firms Present in One vs. Both Periods
2-Period Between
Firm

1-Period Between
2-Period Covariance
1-Period Covariance
Firm
Labor Productivity
Soviet Russia
0.15
-0.01
-0.03
-0.14
Reform Russia
1.63
1.14
0.21
0.08
Multifactor Productivity
Soviet Russia
0.84
0.99
-0.74
-1.30
Reform Russia
2.01
1.03
-1.41
-0.75
Note: “2-period” refers to the contribution to the respective productivity growth term made by firms that appear in both of the periods being
compared, and “1-period” is the contribution made by firms appearing in just one of the two periods being compared.
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Table 7
The Effects of Private Ownership and Market Competition
on Productivity-Enhancing Resource Reallocation:
Between-Firm (within-industry) Regressions
Labor Productivity
MFP
PD*SovietRussia
0.002 (0.69)
-0.010 (-1.24)
PD*ReformRussia
0.032 (2.41)
0.008 (0.69)
PD*ReformUkraine
0.074 (2.01)
0.023 (1.54)
PD*EverPrivate*SovietRussia
0.005 (2.49)
0.008 (1.55)
PD*EverPrivate*ReformRussia
-0.013 (-1.15)
0.010 (0.89)
PD*EverPrivate*ReformUkraine
-0.024 (-1.67)
0.013 (1.30)
PD*Private*ReformRussia
0.035 (3.49)
0.027 (2.10)
PD*Private*ReformUkraine
0.002 (0.34)
-0.011 (-1.11)
PD*ProdDisp.*SovietRussia
-0.001 (-0.46)
0.003 (0.78)
PD*ProdDisp.*ReformRussia
-0.002 (-0.30)
-0.005 (-0.58)
PD*ProdDisp.*ReformUkraine
-0.010 (-2.00)
-0.014 (-1.81)
PD*LaborDisp.*SovietRussia
-0.001 (-1.01)
0.006 (2.78)
PD*LaborDisp.*ReformRussia
-0.001 (-0.38)
0.007 (1.41)
PD*LaborDisp.*ReformUkraine
0.000 (0.00)
0.010 (1.68)
PD*OECDImp*ReformRussia
-0.001 (-0.13)
-0.002 (-0.50)
PD*OECDImp*ReformUkraine
-0.002 (-0.49)
-0.001 (-0.42)
PD*LDCImp*ReformRussia
0.002 (0.60)
0.001 (0.34)
PD*LDCImp*ReformUkraine
-0.006 (-2.01)
0.002 (0.56)
PD*CISImp*ReformRussia
-0.001 (-0.19)
-0.005 (-1.60)
PD*CISImp*ReformUkraine
0.002 (0.71)
-0.001 (-0.35)
Adjusted R2
0.007
0.002
N
171,727
155,261
Note: These are OLS regressions with t statistics, adjusted for firm clustering, reported in
parentheses. The specifications also include country-year effects, main effects for all the variables,
and all two-way interactions. In the first column of results (based on Equation (10) in the text with
β permitted to vary by country, time period, ownership and market structure), PD is the lagged
deviation of the firm’s productivity from the industry average ( Peit −1 − Pit −1 ) divided by nt1*Var(

Peit −1 − Pit −1 ), where nt-1 is the number of firms in year t-1. Soviet Russia refers to 1985-92

and reform to 1993-98. Variable definitions are given briefly in the text and in detail in the Data
Appendix.
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Figure 3a
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Figure 3b
Pre-Exit Multifactor Productivity
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Table 8
The Effects of Private Ownership and Market Competition on ProductivityEnhancing Resource Reallocation: Exit Probability Regressions (Probits)
LP
MFP
PD*Russia
-0.335 (-3.12)
0.026 (0.11)
PD*Ukraine
-0.254 (-1.43)
-0.148 (-0.39)
PD*Private*Russia
-0.103 (-1.78)
-0.235 (-2.44)
PD*Private*Ukraine
-0.157 (-2.27)
-0.669 (-3.27)
PD*ProdDisp.*Russia
0.021 (0.46)
-0.042 (-0.51)
PD*ProdDisp.*Ukraine
0.003 (0.05)
0.092 (0.57)
PD*LaborDisp.*Russia
0.088 (4.37)
0.032 (0.68)
PD*LaborDisp.*Ukraine
0.074 (1.18)
0.046 (0.44)
PD*OECDImp*Russia
-0.049 (-1.31)
-0.046 (-0.50)
PD*OECDImp*Ukraine
-0.107 (-2.10)
-0.156 (-1.72)
PD*LDCImp*Russia
0.029 (1.09)
-0.052 (-0.60)
PD*LDCImp*Ukraine
0.132 (2.00)
0.170 (1.23)
PD*CISImp*Russia
0.066 (0.95)
0.082 (1.11)
PD*CISImp*Ukraine
0.099 (1.92)
0.035 (0.42)
Private*Russia
-0.804 (-11.68)
-1.230 (-12.53)
Private*Ukraine
-1.518 (-8.80)
-1.669 (-5.82)
ProdDisp.*Russia
-0.668 (-12.88)
-0.513 (-7.75)
ProdDisp.*Ukraine
-0.206 (-2.48)
-0.044 (-0.36)
LaborDisp.*Russia
0.169 (5.75)
0.061 (1.53)
LaborDisp.*Ukraine
0.029 (0.51)
0.069 (0.66)
OECDImp*Russia
-0.046 (-1.28)
-0.004 (-0.06)
OECDImp*Ukraine
0.101 (2.34)
0.134 (1.49)
LDCImp*Russia
0.000 (0.01)
-0.042 (-0.52)
LDCImp*Ukraine
-0.059 (-1.24)
0.013 (0.12)
CISImp*Russia
-0.159 (-3.38)
-0.166 (-2.22)
CISImp*Ukraine
0.003 (0.06)
-0.115 (-1.68)
LogEmployment*Russia
-0.075 (-1.77)
-0.060 (-0.87)
LogEmployment*Ukraine
0.016 (0.27)
0.138 (0.89)
Pseudo R2
0.167
0.247
N
99,654
79,843
Note: These are probit regressions for 1993-98, weighted by employment (LP) or the input index (MP).
PD is the difference between the firm’s productivity and the productivity of its 5-digit industry. Tstatistics, shown in parentheses, are based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance. Countryyear effects are also included.
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Table 9
Comparison of Surviving and Non-Surviving Incumbents and
Entrants in Year of Entry
Russia

Ukraine

LP
Nonsurviving
Incumbents
Exitt+1

-0.318
(-9.38)

Exitt+3

Exitt+2
Exitt+3

-0.271
(-7.28)
-0.365
(-7.02)
-0.434
(-12.22)
-0.197
(-2.54)

Exitt+2

Nonsurviving
Entrants
Exitt+1

MP

-0.433
(-7.30)

LP
-0.469
(-5.25)

-0.147
(-2.80)
-0.314
(-6.82)
-0.310
(-6.57)
-0.205
(-1.31)

-0.442
(-4.98)
-0.479
(-5.62)
-0.353
(-2.97)
-0.175
(-3.39)

MP
-0.090
(-1.08)
-0.409
(-3.61)
-0.409
(-3.49)
-0.563
(-5.02)

-0.836
(-3.14)
-0.010
(-0.09)
-0.003
(-0.02)
-0.305
(-1.64)
-0.006
(-0.06)

-0.108
(-1.31)
-0.031
(-0.34)
-0.130
(-1.14)
0.336
(1.19)

-0.920
(-2.95)
-0.031
(-0.11)
-1.003
(-1.67)
-0.433
(-3.14)

-0.506
(-2.88)
1.331
(2.35)
0.581
(2.49)
-0.282
(-1.58)

Surviving
-0.174
-0.007
-0.436
-0.255
Entrants
(-3.36)
(-0.06)
(-3.18)
(-1.44)
1,975
1,143
329
268
Number of
Surviving
Entrants
Number of
1,440
892
139
97
Non-surviving
Entrants
49,481
30,547
20,230
19,998
Number of
Surviving
Incumbents
15,689
12,559
3,149
2,993
Number of
Non-surviving
Incumbents
Note: These are OLS regressions in 1994-97 with t statistics, adjusted for firm clustering, reported in parentheses.
Productivity is regressed on the incumbent and entrant dummies (surviving incumbents is the omitted category),
controlling for industry and year effects. The regressions are weighted by employment (LP) or the input index
(MP). Incumbents are defined as existing since year t-1 or before.
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Table 10
Comparison of Surviving Incumbents and
Entrants Three Years after Entry
Russia

Ukraine

LP

MP

LP

MP

New Entrantst-3

0.031
(0.48)

0.297
(2.71)

0.129
(0.88)

0.013
(0.05)

Number of Entrants

2,057

1,143

971

265

Number of
51,021
30,556
20,804
20,034
Incumbents
Note: These are OLS regressions in 1997-2000 with t statistics, adjusted for firm clustering, reported in
parentheses. Productivity is regressed on the entrant dummy, controlling for industry and year effects. The
omitted category is incumbents, defined as firms existing since year t-4 or before. The regressions are weighted
by employment (LP) or the input index (MP).
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